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are no longer needed. He may release himself, as has been noted, by
giving sufficient notice to the patient to secure the services of another,28
or by turning the case over to another physician, provided of course, he
exercises due care in selecting such substitute.
24
As a generalization, then, it seems that the prevailing view, with
which North Carolina is apparently in accord, is that a physician or
surgeon can relieve himself of liability for the negligent acts and omis-
sions of a substitute physician or surgeon, provided: (1) he is under
no contract which wpuld create greater liability than that which rises
out of the mere physician and patient relationship, (2) -due care is
exercised in selecting such substitute, (3) by the relations actually
existing among the parties under their agreements or acts, agency be-
tween the physicians in fact did not exist.
HUGH P. FORTESCUE, JR.
Torts-Negligence--Intervening Criminal Act
When the deceased entered the defendant's store, the defendant's
fourteen-year-old son pulled a pistol from under the counter and pointed
it at the deceased. Though requested to put it away, he discharged it,
inflicting a fatal wound.
A suit was instituted for the wrongful death against both the de-
fendant and his son. The plaintiff alleged that the 'defendant, who
knew that his son had brandished the pistol at other customers, was
negligent in leaving the pistol where his son could obtain possession of
the dangerous instrumentality. It was further alleged that the son
maliciously shot the deceased and also that the son's act was negligent.
The Georgia court held that the demurrer as to the defendant should
have been sustained since the son's intervening act was criminal and
superseded the defendant's negligence. As to the son, the court said
a cause of action, in negligence, had been stated.,
The statement of the general rule applicable to such cases, that a
subsequent, independent and unforeseeable criminal or negligent act
supersedes the original party's negligence and renders that party not
liable, is followed by the Georgia court. Whether stated in terms of
liability or non-liability for intervening acts, the problem of these cases
is not the statement of the rule but rather the application of the rule
to the facts of a particular case.
The case did not reach a jury, and the holding of the Georgia court
is partially explainable under peculiar local rules of pleading. When a
petition is attacked by demurrer in that state, the facts alleged are taken
2 See note 2 .supra. 2 See note 3 supra.
1 Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880, 57 S. E. 2d 694 (1950).
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as true;2 however, unlike the general rule, the petition is construed
most strongly against the pleader.3 Following these rules, the court
interpreted the petition as alleging that the son's act was malicious and
intentional which would subject the son to criminal prosecution for
murder or manslaughter.4 Furthermore, Georgia is one of the states
which consistently hold intervening criminal acts unforeseeable,5 unless.,
the original party had definite knowledge that the intervening party was
of a vicious disposition. 6 The holding in the case under consideration
is not inconsistent with previous decisions of the Georgia courts.
On the facts it seems that the plaintiff should recover; however,
the petition omitted material allegations, e.g., that the deceased was a
business invitee to whom the defendant owed a duty to provide a
reasonably safe place in which to shop.
7
In an Oregon case, the proprietor of a restaurant was held liable,
on grounds of negligence, when a guest was assaulted by another guest
who was known by the proprietor to create trouble.8 It was so held
even though the intervening act was criminal and the intervening party
had not previously committed a similar crime.P Consequently, it seems
'Readon v. Bland, 206 Ga. 633, 58 S. E. 2d 377 (1950).
Thornton v. Hardin, 205 Ga. 215, 52 S. E. 2d 841 (1949).
'Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880, 57 S. E. 2d 694, 697 (1950). "We
think the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendants ...knew that W. C. Skelton,
Jr., had pointed the pistol at other customers . . . was not sufficient to show
notice on their parts that W. C. Skelton, Jr., would commit the criminal offense
of murder or manslaughter."
IAndrews & Co. v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390, 40 S. E. 300 (1901) (repairman
negligently left side of building in such condition that thieves entered and stole
plaintiff's goods; held, not liable, the subsequent intervening criminal act being
unforeseeable); Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., 100 Ga. 568, 28 S. E. 251 (1897)
(defendant, in charge of a convict under a convict lease system, was held not
liable when the felon escaped and raped plaintiff; the court holding the criminal
act unforeseeable even though the prisoner was known to be of "violent passions,
prone to desire for sexual intercourse"); Pinnell v. Yellow Cab Co., 77 Ga. App.
73, 47 S. E. 2d 774 (1948) (defendant's servant negligently picked up drunk
passenger after plaintiff had hired the taxicab; the second passenger shot the
first; held, plaintiff could not recover since the subsequent criminal act was unfore-
seeable); Hulsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 161 5. E. 664 (1931) (defendant
gave his son a knife with which he intentially inflicted a serious wound upon
plaintiff; held, defendant could not forsee that his son, who was known to have
a reckless and negligent disposition, would commit the crime of attempted murder).
'Henderson v. Molting First Mortgage Corp., 184 Ga. 724, 193 S. E. 347
(1937) (defendant's servant, an apartment house janitor, maliciously shot plaintiff,
held, there could be no recovery on respondent superior, but there was a cause
of action for defendant's negligence in retaining a servant known to be of a
vicious character).
SFanelty v. Rogers Jewelers, 230 N. C. 694, 55 S. E. 2d 493 (1949) ; Ross
v. Sterling Drug Store, 225 N. C. 226, 34 S. E. 2d 64 (1945) (plaintiff injured
due to a defective "door check" which applied force to close the front door of
defendant's store; held, judgment for plaintiff reversed because of instructions
which could be interpreted to mean a storekeeper has absolute liability for in-
juries sustained by business invitees). See Note 18 N. C. L. Rav. 163 (1939)
for a discussion of the positive duty owed a business invitee.
'Peck v. Gerber, 154 Ore. 126, 59 P. 2d 675 (1936).
'While the assaulting guest had attempted to hit others, it was not shown
that he had done so.
19511
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the defendant in the principal case might have been held liable on the
theory that he had failed to provide a safe shoppinf place for the de-
ceased, a business invitee. The previous pointing of the pistol and
the probability of a continuation of this practice, as long as the pistol
was lying around, had rendered the place unsafe.
There was no allegation as to who was in charge of the store when
the injury was inflicted. If the defendant was present, support is lent
to the argument that he failed to use reasonable care in providing a
safe shopping place for the deceased since there is nothing to show
that he attempted to prevent the discharge of the pistol. If the defendant
was not present, it is possible that the son was in charge of the store.
This raises the question of defendant's liability based on respondeat
superior. In fact, the court itself raised this question, but held the
allegations insufficient to show an agency.10
It has been suggested that the proprietor of a store be held abso-
lutely liable for intentional torts committed by their servants.1  This,
however, has not been done except in cases involving common carriers
1 2
and public service corporations.' 3 Nevertheless, a proprietor will be
held liable if he does not use reasonable care in the selection and reten-
tion of servants and refrain from putting the customer in a position
where it is likely that a tort will occur.14 The latter statement seems
particularly applicable to the principal case if an agency could be
established.
Not only did the plaintiff omit material allegations in his petition,
but the allegations are inconsistent. The plaintiff alleged that the son's
act was both malicious' 5 and negligent.' 6 As pointed out above, the
court construing the petition against the petitioner held the son's act
criminal and this in the face of the court's subsequent conclusion that
a cause of action in negligence was stated against the son.
In a jurisdiction which construes pleadings most strongly in favor
of the pleader, the decision would probably have been contra, since the
allegations are capable of the construction that the defendant was negli-
10 Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880, 57 S. E. 2d 694, 697 (1950). "Nor
do we think the mere allegation 'that said store was owned and operated by the
defendants named herein,' was sufficient to show that the son was acting as
servant or agent of the parents and within the scope of their employment."
" See Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 216 N. C. 322, 324, 4 S. E. 2d 889,
890 (1939) (dissenting opinion).
12 Daniel v. Railroad, 117 N. C. 592, 23 S. E. 327 (1895).
"Munick v. City of Durham, 181 N. C. 188, 106 S. E. 665 (1921).
'See Note 18 N. C. L. REv. 163, 166.
' In the second allegation, the plaintiff alleged, "that this suit is brought for
the malicious homicide of petitioners' mother, and wife... " Skelton v. Gam-
brell, 80 Ga. App. 880, 57 S. E. 2d 694, 695 (1950).
" Plaintiff in his eighteenth allegation alleged, "That the defendant W. C.
Skelton, Jr., was negligent in the following ... " Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga.
App. 880, 57 S. E. 2d 694, 695 (1950).
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gent in failing to foresee the intervening negligence of the son, who had
previously pointed the pistol at people in the store.
17
North Carolina follows the general rule that an intervening and
foreseeable negligent act will not insulate the original party's negli-
gence. 8 There are very few cases in this state dealing with intervening
criminal acts19 and in only one case was defendant held liable.
2 0
In cases of intervening negligence of third parties, there are North
Carolina cases which make a distinction between the active and the
passive negligence of the defendant. Where the negligence of the inter-
vening third party is active at the time of the accident and the defend-
ant's negligence is passive, defendant has been relieved from liability.
2 '
In the principal case, defendant's negligence might be regarded as
passive, unless it can be argued that there was a continuing duty to
protect the business invitee. Justice Seawell's opinion to the effect that
storekeepers should be responsible to customers for all acts of their
employees, criminal as well as negligent, is not applicable to the Georgia
case under discussion because there was no allegation that the son was
an employee or agent.
It is doubtful whether the Georgia court would deny the general
proposition that if the intervening act and resultant injury could reason-
ably have been foreseen by the defendant, he remains liable. The prob-
lem is one of the extent or scope of protection which the law affords in
these cases of intervening criminal or negligent acts. If the proprietor
of a store creates or maintains a risk of danger to his customers, it
would not be unreasonable to hold him responsible for the intervening
'7 Sullivan v. Creed, [1904] 2 K. B. 317 (defendant left gun inside hedge where
minor son found it and negligently shot the plaintiff).
" Rulane Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 231 N. C. 270, 56 S. E. 2d
689 (1949) ; Henderson v. Powell, 221 N. C. 239, 19 S. E. 2d 876 (1942) ; Horton
v. Tel. Co., 141 N. C. 455, 463, 54 S. E. 299, 302 (1906). ". . . the test . . . is
whether the intervening act and the resultant injury is one that the author of the
primary negligence could have reasonably foreseen and expected."
"o Ward v. Southern Railway Co., 206 N. C. 530, 174 S. E. 443 (1934) (plain-
tiff was killed when struck by a piece of coal thrown from defendant's car;
held, assuming defendant was negligent in allowing thieves to be on the train,
nevertheless, the plaintiff cannot recover since the intervening criminal act was
unforeseeable) ; Chancey v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 174 N. C. 351, 93 S. E. 834
(1917) (plaintiff, -who was robbed due to defendant's negligence in not properly
lighting its cars, was denied recovery since the intervening criminal act was un-
foreseeable).
'o Britton v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air-Line Ry., 88 N. C. 536 (1883) (defendant
held liable when his servant failed to protect plaintiff, a Negro, from an assault
by other passengers known to the servant to be reckless and dissatisfied with
plaintiff's presence).
" Montgomery v. Blades, 222 N. C. 463, 23 S. E. 2d 844 (1943), rehearing
denied, 223 N. C. 331, 26 S. E. 2d 567 (1943) (plaintiff injured when driver, of
car in which she was riding negligently ran into a pillow constructed in the street
by defendants; held, defendants' negligence was static while the drivers negligence
was active but for which the injury would not have occurred, therefore, defendant
not liable) ; Haney v. Town of Lincolnton, 207 N. C. 282, 176 S. E. 573 (1934);
see Note 13 N. C. L. R~. 245 (1935).
1951]
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act which might be foreseen as likely to happen as a result of that risk.
It has never been a requirement that the exact nature of the intervening
act be foreseeable.
PAUL K. PLUNKETr.
Torts--Liability of Parent for Willful Injury to Child
By the overwhelming weight of authority in this country an uneman-
cipated minor may not bring an action for personal tort against his
parent.' The Supreme Court of Oregon has recently engrafted an
exception on this general rule, holding that an unemancipated minor
may maintain an action against his parent for a willful or malicious tort.
2
In the Oregon case, a father, intoxicated and accompanied by his
brother and son as passengers, drove his pickup truck at high speed at
night over a mountainous highway. An accident ensued which resulted
in the death of all the occupants of the truck. The court held that the
father's estate could be sued for the wrongful death of the unemancipated
minor, the majority regarding the case as one presenting "willful mis-
conduct" for which the father should be held liable to his son.
With this decision another inroad has been made into the general
rule disallowing tort actions between unemancipated minors and their
parents. The action has been allowed heretofore in the case of a minor
but emancipated child ;3 where the child was of legal age but continued
to live at home with his parents ;4 where the suit was brought by or
against one in loco parentis;5 and in negligence cases where the defend-
ant is protected by liability insurance.6 An unemancipated minor has
I Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) ; Small v. Morrison, 185
N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923) ; McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S. W.
644 (1903) ; see Note, 71 A. L. R. 1071 (1931). "Proprietary torts" between
parent and minor in matters affecting property and contract seem always to have
been freely recognized. Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N. Y. 317, 41 N. E. 26 (1895);
Myers v. Myers, 47 W. Va. 487, 35 S. E. 868 (1900); PaossER, HANDROOH OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 905 (1941).
, Cowgill v. Broock, 218 P. 2d 445 (Ore. 1950).
' Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A. 2d 586 (1948) ; Fowlkes v. Ray-O-Vac
Co., 52 Ga. App. 338, 183 S. E. 210 (1935) ; Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297,
25 N. E. 2d 766 (1940); Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N. W. 763
(1908); Cafaro v. Cafaro, 14 N. J. Misc. 331, 184 Atl. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Crosby v. Crosby, 230 App. Div. 651, 246 N. Y. Supp. 384 (1930); Detwiler v.
Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super. 383, 57 A. 2d 426 (1948).
'Ledgerwood v. Ledgerwood, 141 Cal. App. 538, 300 Pac. 144 (1931) ; Farrar
v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App. 120, 152 S. E. 278 (1930); Ponder v. Ponder, 157 So.
627 (La. App. 1934); Weyan v. Weyan, 165 Miss. 257, 139 So. 608 (1932);
Taylor v. Taylor, 232 S. W. 2d 382 (Mo. 1950).
5 Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961 (1901); Dix v.
Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S. W. 133 (1913); Clasen v. Pruhs. 69 Neb. 278,
95 N. W. 640 (1903) ; Stiber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 206 N. W. 172 (1925).
'Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930); Lusk v. Lusk, 113
W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. 2d
343 (1939); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Marchland, [1924] (Can.) S. C. R. 86, 13
B. R. C. 1135. For a discussion of this problem, see Note, 11 N. C. L. REV.
352 (1933).
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